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HOW MANY LIBERTARIANS DOES IT TAKE
TO FIX THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM?

Thomas L. Greaney*
MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? By
Richard A. Epstein. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc.
1997. Pp. xvi, 503. $27.50.
There's an old joke about a Southern preacher who is asked
whether he believes in the sacrament of infant baptism. "Believe in
it?" thunders the preacher. "Hell, son, I've seen it done. " In Mortal
Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care?, Richard Epstein1
gives testimony that markets should be left unfett�red to distribute
health care services. Arguing from first principles, he aims to per
suade that the messy, confusing business of health care is best dealt
with by simple legal rules: permit free contracting, countenance no
government-induced subsidies, recognize no positive rights. One
leaves this particular revival tent feeling he has heard a good ser
mon on the wages of sin (failed government regulation), but has not
been given much reason to believe in the preacher's promised land
(libertarian capitalism).
The book's skeptically phrased subtitle, "Our Inalienable Right
to Health Care?" cleverly captures the two principle themes of the
book. Used in a positive sense, as in the Declaration of Indepen
dence, an "inalienable" right to health care connotes a fundamental
right - an interpretation that might be derived from regarding
health care as a prerequisite to the pursuit of happiness. From this,
Epstein warns, it is "but a short leap to the proposition of universal
access to health care" (p. xiv), which is the bete noire that he seeks
to slay in the first half of the book. He marches the reader through
the difficulties in limiting futile care, the problems of defining and
providing necessary indigent care, the paradoxes of community rat
ing and mandatory insurance, and finally the failure of two compre
hensive access programs, Medicare and the proposed Clinton
administration health reforms. The second meaning of "inaliena
ble" is negative: legal rules impose restraints on alienation in
health care by restricting freedom of contract in matters such as
organ transplantation, euthanasia and assisted suicide, and tort liaProfessor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. B.A. 1970, Wesleyan; J.D.
Harvard. - Ed. I am indebted to Sandra Johnson for helpful and probing comments.
1. James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
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bility. The second half of the book investigates the law's pervasive
interference with autonomy in health care matters from an individ
ual rights perspective that Epstein asserts is "closer to the sense of
the original Declaration of Independence than the modern gloss
that has been placed on it" (p. xv) .
Why Epstein believes his two targets (government-sponsored
access and legal restrictions on contracting) place us in "mortal
peril," however, is less clear. True, a free market for organs might
save lives by expanding the supply of a scarce resource. But eutha
nasia, assisted suicide, and contracting for lower thresholds of tort
liability? Though these practices might save resources, they might
well increase the aggregate mortal peril of the citizenry. Likewise,
removing entitlements to health care services hardly seems calcu
lated to improve the nation's health. Wasteful as government enti
tlements may be, their eradication can scarcely be said to avoid
mortal peril for those who rely on them to obtain health services.
Epstein's apparent answer lies in the alchemy of the market. Free
markets improve the flow of resources and increase aggregate so
cial welfare. Ultimately this rising tide will lift even the health care
boat: "[T]he size of the resource base does more for the creation of
good health than any political interventions designed to skew its
use" (p. 219). I say apparent answer because Epstein is un
characteristically vague about explaining just how things will work
themselves out. And despite the asserted power of Epsteinian eco
nomics, he looks to the deus ex machina of charitable care to assure
adequate health to all.
In this review, I argue that the history, economics, and politics
of health markets belie Epstein's abstract reasoning. Though much
of the argument in Mortal Peril is written in the language of eco
nomics and cost-benefit analysis, Epstein's core faith is libertarian
ism. I attempt to show below that he eschews careful analysis of the
economic complexities of health care markets in favor of simple
principles that focus almost entirely on autonomy. It should be un
derstood, especially by policymakers, that the resulting harsh policy
prescriptions are not compelled by economic reasoning but by a set
of arbitrarily chosen first principles.
Because of the constraints of time and my own predilection, this
review focuses on the portions of the book of greatest importance
to the health care reform debate that has been going on in Washing
ton and most state capitals over the last five years. Part I discusses
the principles and methodology Epstein brings to the task of ana
lyzing health law and policy and Part II expressly takes up the au
thor's challenge to test his analysis with empirical evidence. The
remainder of the review focuses on the three principal market re
form issues addressed in Mortal Peril: Part III takes on Epstein's
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critique of programs providing care to the poor or cross-subsidizing
such care; Part IV analyzes his approach to regulations affecting
insurance and managed care; and Part V focuses on the discussion
of Medicare and the Clinton administration's health reform
proposals.
I.

METHODOLOGY AND .MEs SAGE

Mortal Peril can be seen as Epstein's effort to deploy many of
the themes and principles developed over an uncommonly prolific
academic career to see how they might work in practice. His influ
ential and widely discussed writings on takings, tort law, individual
rights, and regulation form a body of scholarship that rivals Richard
Posner's in sweep and renown among legal academics. An impor
tant feature of his recent scholarship is an attempt to develop sim
plified, common-law-based principles to address complex legal
issues.2 Epstein is also justly acclaimed for his willingness to con
front the most difficult challenges to his positions. In choosing to
paint on the canvas of the health care sector, he has characteristi
cally taken on a daunting challenge. Health care markets are noto
rious for their peculiarity and complexity, as well as the emotional
rhetoric they inspire. One would be hard pressed to think of an
area less hospitable to consensus on simple solutions that rely on
first principles. Epstein at least deserves credit for choosing to test
drive his theories on such a difficult terrain.
In the end, however, Mortal Peril does not meet this ambitious
goal. Measured against his promise that the book's arguments are
"not advanced as deductive certainties, but as empirical proposi
tions, capable of being tested in particular contexts" (p. 20), Epstein
utterly fails to meet his own standard of proof. Indeed, he hardly
tries. Instead of marshaling evidence and proposing policies that
would persuade the reader that simple rules based on first princi
ples can and do work in health care, Epstein contents himself with
tracing out the implications of his philosophy and selectively criti
cizing deficiencies in existing regulation.3 Part II of this review
2. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLES FOR A COMPLEX WoRLo (1995).
Epstein identifies six basic rules: "self-ownership, or autonomy; first possession; voluntary
exchange; protection against aggression; limited privilege for cases of necessity; and takings
of property for public use on payment of just compensation." Id. at 53. He also suggests a
somewhat qualified and orphaned seventh rule that if there is to be redistribution to the poor
it must be financed by fiat taxes. See id. at 148.
3. Similar problems plague Epstein's defense of his seven simple rules. Though asserting
"the most powerful justification for the rule [of self-ownership] is empirical," he offers no
such evidence. EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 59; see also Jill Elaine Hasday, Book Note, Preach
ing to the Choir, 105 YALE L.J. 1153, 1157-58 (1997) (reviewing EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLES FOR
A CoMPLEX WoRLD (1995)) ("Rather than cite specific empirical evidence, Epstein analyzes
the theoretical disadvantages of alternatives to self-ownership based on the assumption of
rational maximizing behavior (pp. 55-58). On that basis, he concludes that his rule maximizes
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takes up the author's challenge, offering some empirical observa
tions that raise serious questions about the economic efficiency of
the libertarian health care market Epstein envisions. Ultimately,
Epstein comprehensively documents the failure of health law and
policy to heed his advice, but neglects to offer convincing proof that
society would be better off if that advice were followed. As the
author acknowledges, in understatement, his book "is not rich in
quick fixes for intractable problems" (p. xii) . Indeed, one might go
further: the reader is only given a glimpse of what the Epsteinian
health market would look like.
A second problem involves Epstein's methodological inconsis
tencies. A social scientist would probably find it surprising that a
law professor professing a strong kinship with economists and
economics-oriented policy analysts would disregard their research
in the health care field. The works of thoughtful health economists
like Pauly, Fuchs, Dranove, Newhouse, and Reinhart are ignored
and the voluminous health services literature is not consulted.
Likewise, Epstein does not discuss the important writings on risk,
preference shaping, and psychological analyses of market behavior.
These omissions are particularly glaring because throughout Mortal
Peril the author purports to champion a welfare-maximizing ap
proach consistent with sound microeconomic principles. Indeed,
notwithstanding Epstein's libertarian philosophy, his argument is
distinctly deontological and utilitarian. Throughout Mortal Peril he
deploys the language and methodology of economics and cost
benefit analysis, principally to deride the current state of regulation
in health care.4 Yet, as discussed in this review, he pays no atten
tion to the subtleties and imperfections of the market that have
caused even the most ardent market enthusiasts to endorse some
forms of governmental intervention.
Never far from the surface is the tension between Epstein's
strongly held libertarian views, which reject most forms of state co
ercion, and his invocation of economic/utilitarian modes of analysis,
which sometimes require governmental meddling to assure efficient
outcomes. The sources of this tension are several. First, as Martha
Nussbaum has noted, the libertarian preference for liberty over
efficiency and asserts that people would choose such a regime if placed behind 'a veil of
ignorance' (pp. 57-58).").
4. For example, Epstein describes the role of law in fundamentally utilitarian terms ("The
grand task for all legal and social institutions is to try to find some way to arrange for human
affairs to secure the largest net benefit to the public at large," p. 417); faults proponents of
laws mandating emergency treatments for not asking "whether over time [the laws] will in
crease the number of lives saved, or more properly, raise them to a level that justifies the
public expenditures," p. 104; criticizes laws promoting community rating as prohibiting the
market from reaching a "stable equilibrium" and fostering inefficiency, pp. 121-31; and assails
Medicare and the Clinton Health Security Acts for their "hidden subsidies and the massive
dislocations they cause," p. 146.
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other values is "on a collision course" with utilitarianism, which is
at bottom committed to pursuing the greatest total (or average)
utility.5 Infringements upon liberty and property may produce
greater social welfare; categorically assuming that such infringe
ments inexorably decrease utility is nothing more than a sleight of
the invisible hand.6 Second, under Sen's paradox, libertarianism
comes into inevitable conflict with utilitarianism employing the
Pareto optimality criterion whenever one recognizes other-regard
ing preferences.7 Dismissing all such preferences cannot withstand
close economic and efficiency scrutiny. Finally, adoption of a social
welfare criterion that aggregates welfare across persons runs
squarely into traditional libertarianism. Hence, Epstein's avowed
acceptance of utilitarianism as the "justificatory apparatus for de
marcating the scope of state power from the area of individual
choice"8 is a move away from libertarian orthodoxy.9 However, as
discussed below, this move may be a feint because Epstein's utilita
rian analysis is skewed to yield libertarian outcomes.
An example of how this tension between libertarianism and util
itarianism plays out is found in Epstein's treatment of charity care.
A critical juncture in utilitarian analysis is the choice of a measure
of what law and policy should seek to maximize. Strict utilitarian
ism seeks to maximize individuals' happiness by using some metric
of utility. For many, including most economists, wealth maximiza
tion supplies a convenient, albeit imperfect, proxy for utility. It is
imperfect because it fails to account for differences in distributions
of wealth and is particularly suspect, as Epstein admits, "when cer
tain transactions do not get completed because the prospective
buyer lacks necessary funds" (p. 34). Nonetheless, Posner and
others rely on the impossibility of making interpersonal compari
sons of utility as a grounds for sticking to the wealth maximization
criterion.10 Epstein acknowledges that the "wedge between maxi
mizing social wealth and maximizing utility" provides the strongest
5. Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular
Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L., REv. 1197, 1206-07 (1997).
6. See id. at 1207 ("[l]f one tries dogmatically to rig things so that restrictions on liberty
always result in more utility losses than gains, one is simply robbing the idea of utility
maximizing of any predictive value.").
7. See Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. PoL. EcoN. 152 (1970);
see also Jason Scott Johnston, Not So Cold an Eye: Richard Posner's Pragmatism, 44 VAND.
L. REv. 741, 750 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
(1990)) (criticizing Epstein because he "misses the logical conflict between libertarianism and
efficiency").
8. EPSTEIN supra note 2, at 30.
9. See Heidi Li Feldman, Libertarianism with a Twist, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1883, 1891 (1996)
(reviewing EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A CoMPLEX WORLD (1995)); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-13 (4th ed. 1992) (distinguishing value and utility).
10. See POSNER, supra note 9, at 13.
,
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theoretical support to the claim for a right to health care (p. 31). By
this he acknowledges that aggregate welfare-improving transactions
may not occur when individuals are unable to afford to pay and that
strict adherence to the wealth maximization norm would neglect
these improvements. However theoretically or empirically valid
this concern might be, the problems raised are "only instrumental
and not moral" (p. 32) and can be tolerated because voluntary
transactions in the form of charitable giving provide a more reliable
means of making accurate interpersonal utility comparisons (pp. 3537). As to the argument advanced by some, including libertarians,11
that charitable provision of health care is a public good that will be
under-provided in the marketplace due to free-rider problems and
related market imperfections, Epstein questions (without providing
evidence or anecdote) whether such a problem exists. If it does, he
would allow for state intervention only to the extent of subsidizing
charity through tax incentives. Here, libertarian principles trump
despite the purported commitment to a social welfare standard de
scribed above. A utilitarian examination of the costs and benefits
of the alternatives may well reveal that market imperfections are
significant and that tax policy is an inefficient means of correcting
market failure.
II.

WILL LAISSEZ-FAIRE POLICIES PRODUCE EFFICIENT HEALTH
CARE MARKETS?: SOME EMPIRICAL COUNTERPOINTS

The competitive revolution in health care is approximately
twenty years old - an ample period within which to gauge its per
formance.12 While market forces have undoubtedly fostered cost
savings and efficiency-enhancing improvements, there is abundant
evidence suggesting that health care markets perform less optimally
than others. Those who would resist regulatory efforts to improve
competition in the health care sector (or would withdraw from gov
ernment all regulatory functions) might be expected to address
these documented failures of the private market. Astonishingly,
Epstein says almost nothing about how the competitive market in
health care has developed so far. The following empirical observa
tions underscore the point that persistent market imperfections un11. See, e.g., Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to A Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13
PHIL. & Pua. A.FF. 55, 68-72 (1984).
12. Passage of the HMO Act during the Nixon administration in 1975 signaled Congress's
active encouragement of competition in the health care sector and began a series of steps that
ultimately undermined various legal and professional norms that supported a professional
paradigm in health care delivery and financing. Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(e)-(e)(9) (1994). See Clark C. Havighurst, The Professional Paradigm
ofMedical Care: Obstacle to Decentralization, 30 JuRIMETRICS J. 415, 416 n.2 (1990) (identi
fying 1979 as a "the watershed year" for acceptance of competition in health care when Con
gress rejected the Carter administration's proposal to regulate hospital rates and encouraged
competition in health·care in amendments to federal health planning legislation).
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dermine the efficient functioning of health care markets. Together
they support the contention that government intervention to pro
mote an infrastructure conducive to competition could produce su
perior econ�mic outcomes.13

Fraud, Abuse, and Waste
The health care sector countenances enormous losses due to
fraud, waste, and abuse in paying for provider services that are un
necessary, fraudulently billed, or otherwise improperly provided.
By some accounts, fraud and abuse contribute ten percent or eighty
billion dollars to �nnual health care spending.14 While much of the
looting unquestionably can be traced to the door of governmental
programs that lack competitive rigor and arguably are not well
monitored, the problem is shared by payers in the highly competi
tive private sector.15 Indeed, the practice of provider "self refer
rals," which studies indicate raised costs of care, was tolerated for
many years until federal enforcement stepped in.16 The magnitude
and persistence of these practices lend support to the argument that
health care markets are uniquely plagued by informational deficits
owing to the nature of health care services and the reliance of both
patients and payers on provider judgments.

Demographics and Local Market Structures
Many parts of the country lack a population base sufficient to
support workable competition, as envisioned by managed competi
tion advocates. Demographic evidence suggests that as much as
thirty or forty percent of the country resides in markets that have
natural monopoly or natural oligopoly characteristics because fewer
than three integrated systems are likely to form at efficiently con
figured network levels.17 Antitrust law, which intervenes to pro13. The themes set forth in this section update and confirm views expressed ten years ago
about the need for regulation to permit effective competition. See Thomas L. Greaney,
Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnerable Revolution, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 179
(1988).
14. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, Conceptualizing, Estimating, and
Reforming Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Healthcare Spending, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 455, 488,
489 tbl.2 (1994).
15. See id. (discussing prevalence and estimates of straightforward fraud and abuse); Kurt
Eichenwald, Unwitting Doctors and Patients Exploited in a Vast Billing Fraud, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1998, at Al (citing estimates of more than one billion dollars in losses by private
health insurance companies from false claims).
16. See RICHARD P. KussEROW, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FINANCIAL
ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN PHYSICIANS AND HEALTH CARE BUSINESSES: REPORT TO CON
GRESS 18 (1989) (documenting higher incidence of treatment for patients referred to clinical
laboratories in which referring physician had investment interest).
17. See Richard Kronick et al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform - The
Demographic Limitations of Managed Competition, 328 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 148, 150 (1993).
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hibit inefficient consolidations or private agreements, has little to
say about markets that are structurally uncompetitive owing to
scale economies.18 Conventional economic theory posits that regu
latory interventions are appropriate unless the threat of entry
makes such markets perform competitively. A further consequence
of unconstrained market forces may be to permit consolidations
and closings of facilities in rural markets so that residents will be
deprived of adequate access to health care. Whether these
problems call for regulatory interventions to control price, en
courage development of buyer cooperatives large enough to impose
"yardstick" pricing on rural markets, subsidize rural health care
services, or establish other mechanisms is open to question. Never
theless, the data indicate that an unchecked market may produce
results that are economically inefficient or unacceptable to
policymakers.19
Adverse Selection and Risk Adjustment
It has long been recognized that health insurance markets are
particularly vulnerable to adverse selection, which ultimately inter
feres with the market obtaining equilibrium.20 The strong tendency
of adverse selection to affect the behavior of health insurers is
driven in part by the skewed distribution of health expenditures in
the United States. One percent of the population accounts for
thirty percent of all health spending while fifty percent of the popu
lation account for only one percent of health spending.21 Adverse
selection causes many distortions in health care markets: it deters
small business from offering insurance, discourages an efficient of
fering of certain kinds of coverage (for example, mental health
services), and has fostered many ill-advised government corrective
measures such as mandated benefits and other insurance laws.22
Selection problems might be dealt with in the market by buyers'
developing counter-measures. However, the evidence suggests that
employers offering multiple plans rarely risk-adjust for enrollees'
health characteristics. In the absence of such adjusted payments,
18. See Michael S. Jacobs, Rural Health Care and State Antitrust Refonn, 47 MERCER L.
REv. 1045, 1060-61 (1996).
19. See Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and
Antitrust, 79 CoRNELL L. REv. 1507, 1521 (1994).
20. See CoNGRESSIONAL REs . SERV., lOlsr CONG., lsr SESs., INSURING THE UNINSURED:
OPTIONS AND ANALYSIS (Comm. Print 1988); WHITE HousE TASK FORCE ON HEALTH RISK
POOLING, HEALTH RISK POOLING FOR SMALL-GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE 15-16 (1993);
Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, 90 Q.J.
ECON. 629 (1976).
21. See M.L. Berk & A.C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Expenditures: An
Update, HEALTH A.FF. , Wmter 1992, at 145, 146.
22. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Economists, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Health Care Reform,
HEALTH A.FF., Spring 1995, at 182, 184.
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plans have strong incentives to engage in "cherry picking." More
over, the phenomenon may create disincentives to compete on
quality because, perversely, having a good reputation for quality
can lead to unfavorable selection. Difficulties in developing ade
quate mechanisms for risk adjustment have plagued Medicare and
private insurance pools seeking to reduce adverse selection.23

Variations in Medical Practice, Outcomes Research
. Numerous studies have documented that wide variations exist
among providers in the nature and intensities of treatments and
that these differences in medical interventions cannot be explained
by scientific evidence.24 Likewise, it is widely recognized that the
medical profession lacks a,dequate outcomes research to assist con
sumers and insurers in selecting providers or pay plans based on
demonstrable evidence of quality and cost effectiveness. As a re
sult, though there has been vigorous competition among plans
based on price and nonprice variables (for example, choice of phy
sician, style of care, and breadth of network), there is very little
evidence of rivalry based on outcomes or quality of care indica
tors.25 Economic analysis, of course, stresses the importance of the
production of information as a prerequisite to effective competi
tion.26 Experience suggests that transaction cost and public good
problems may prevent the market from producing optimal levels of
information.

Employers

as

Imperfect Agents

, As a result of tax policies and historical developments, the em
ployment relationship dominates the choice of health plans: nearly
three-fourths of privately insured consumers buy health insurance
through their employers. In theory, this relationship might improve
the functioning of the market by counteracting information deficits.
23. See Joseph P. Newhouse, Patients at Risk: Health Reform and Risk Adjustment,
HEALTH A.FF., Spring 1994, at 132, 139 ("[T]he good news . . . is that there is a substantial
literature on risk adjustment. The bad news is that the literature could be summarized as:
We don't know how to do it very well despite several years of trying.").

24. See THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (John E.
& Megan McAndrew Cooper eds., 1996); John Wennberg, Dealing with Medical
Practice Variations: A Proposal for Action, HEALTH A.FF. , Summer 1984, at 6.
25. See Robert H. Miller, Competition in the Health Care System: Good News and Bad
News, HEALTH A.FF. , Summer 1996, at 107, 117.
26. See Mark V. Pauly, The Public Policy Implications of Using Outcome Statistics, 58
BROOK. L. REv. 35, 50 (1992) ("The ideal of competition involves much more than multiple
Wennberg

producers of care trying to attract patients. Decades of evidence proves that competition
alone, in the face of distorted incentives and imperfect information, will not produce an out
come that will make people happy. The ideal of a competitive market, as outlined by
Enthoven, involves more than just many sellers. Such a market also involves knowledgeable
buyers facing proper financial incentives." (citation omitted)).
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Employers might act as savvy purchasers, gathering information
and negotiating insurance contracts on behalf of employees. How
ever, dependence on employers for purchasing insurance has pro
duced highly idiosyncratic results. B oth the choices and
affordability of insurance vary significantly among employers.
Large employers almost uniformly offer health insurance to em
ployees; more than half of small employers do not.27 Eighty per
cent of small employers offer only one health plan to their
employees,28 and these employees pay higher co-pays and deduct
ibles and a higher percentage of premiums than employees of larger
firms.29 Contrary to the managed care model for competition, few
small employers have joined small business purchasing coalitions.30
Finally, employer-dominated coverage has created certain well
recognized problems: distortion of individuals' choices in the labor
market and "job lock," that is, creating artificial incentives for peo
ple to stay in their jobs because of fear losing of health insurance
coverage.31

Individuals as Informed Purchasers
Competition-based reforms that require consumers to partici
pate in care-limiting decisions under the shadow of financial incen
tives implicitly assume that consumers are capable of making
rational decisions. Studies indicate, however, that individuals are
- perhaps inevitably - poorly equipped to be informed consum
ers of health care. They lack medical training to evaluate the need
for alternative courses of treatments; they do not have adequate
data to weigh the costs and benefits of care; and they are unlikely to
act as rational, detached consumers at the time of illness.32 The
results of the well-known RAND Health Insurance Experiment,
which closely examined the behavior of patients with insurance cov
erage requiring cost-sharing, suggest, for example, that patients are
27. See Paul B. Ginsburg et al., Tracking Small-Firm Coverage, 1989-1996, HEALTH AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 167, 168 (stating that 99% of firms with more than 200 employees offered
health benefits to employees in 1996 compared to only 49% of smaller firms).
28. See Jon R. Gabel et al., Small Employers and their Health Benefits, 1988-1996: An
Awkward Adolescence; Limited Choice and High Out-of-pocket Costs for Employees May
Help to Explain the Managed Care Backlash, HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 103, 105.
29. See id. at 107-08.
30. See Miller, supra note 25, at 118.
31. Though the recently enacted Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ad
dresses the problems of portability and renewability of private insurance, the legislative rem
edy is of limited scope. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAw: CASES, MATERIALS,
AND PROBLEMS 824-34 {3d ed. 1997).
32. For an excellent elaboration of this argument and summary of the literature on pa
tient spending decisions, see MAruc A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE
LAW, ETHICS, AND ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS 43-50 (1997); see sources cited
infra note 33 and accompanying text.
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unable to make medically sound decisions as to whether to seek
treatment.33 Other studies question whether consumers can or will
choose providers based on quality preferences even when informa
tion is available. One notable study suggests that even those pa
tients most expected to engage in quality-based searches in
choosing providers rarely do so.34 The ability of consumers or their
employers to monitor effectively the quality of health care services
is open to serious question.3s

Recent Legislative Reform
Health care reform did not end with the defeat of the Clinton
administration's proposal in 1994. State legislatures have adopted a
large number of statutes regulating managed care organizations;36
insuring portability and placing restrictions on variations and in
creases in premium rates;37 restricting the use of genetic informa
tion in health insurance;38 and improving the market for small
group insurance by promoting health purchasing cooperatives, im
posing risk adjustment mechanisms and instituting other reforms.39
33. See HALL, supra note 32, at 49 (RAND study confirms that "patients are both not
capable of making good individual treatments on their own and that they rely heavily on
their physicians' reco=endations even when they are paying out of pocket"); JosEPH NEW
HOUSE, FREE FOR ALL? LESSONS FROM THE RA.ND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT

{1993). On the broad implications of the RAND study for demand theory in health services,
see Thomas Rice, An Alternative Framework for Evaluating Welfare Losses in the Health
Care Market, 11 J. HEALTH EcoN. 85 (1992); see also Feldman & Dowd, What Does the
Demand Curve for Medical Care Measure?, 12 J. HEALTH EcoN. 193 (1993); Martin Gaynor
& William B. Vogt, What Does Economics Have to Say About Health Policy Anyway? A
Comment and Correction on Evans and Rice, 22 J. HEALTH PoL. POLY. & L. 475, 485-86
(1998) (critical responses); see generally Kathleen Lohr et al., Effect of Cost-sharing on Use of
Medically Effective and Less Effective Care, 24 MEo. CARE S-31 (1986) (in Supplement: Use
of Medical Care in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: Diagnosis- and Service-Specific
Analyses in a Randomized Controlled Trial).
34. See T.J. Hoerger & Howard, Search Behavior and Choice ofPhysician in the Market
for Prenatal Care, 33 MEo. CARE 332 {1995).
35. See Tunothy S. Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Manage
ment, or the Market?, 31 Aruz. L. REv. 825, 855 (1995) ("[I]t takes a mighty leap of faith to
believe that consumers will in fact choose the plan or institution that is in some absolute
sense either the highest quality or the most appropriate for their needs."); Haya R. Rubin,
Can Patients Evaluate the Quality of Hospital Care?, 41 MEo. CARE REv. 267 (1990).
36. Forty states have passed a variety of such laws, including statutes requiring managed
care plans to provide information to emollees and prospective members; setting standards
for mandatory length of stays for maternity care; regulating utilization review criteria; ensur
ing access to emergency care; mandating provision of direct access to obstetricians/gynecolo
gists. See Surveys and Studies: Managed Care, 14 Health Care Poly. Rep. (BNA) 568 (Apr. 7,
1997).
37. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION: VARIATION
IN STATE SMALL EMPLOYER HEALTH INsuRANCE REFORMS, GAO/HEHS-95-161 FS, at 20
(1995).
38. See John Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 330-31
(1997).
39. See MARK A. HALL, REFORMING PRIVATE HEALTH INsuRANcE 3 (1994); Linda J.
Blumberg & Len M. Nichols, First, Do No Harm: Developing Health Insurance Market Re-
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At the federal level, the Health Insurance Portability and Account
ability Act of 199640 imposed rules assuring greater portability of
insurance and requiring guaranteed issue or renewal of insurancein
certain circumstances. Congress also greatly expanded health in
surance for children by adopting the Children's Health Insurance
Program,41 which will provide up to $24 billion over four years in
federal funds to assist state programs to insure ten million chil
dren.42 These laws evidence a strong endorsement of cross
subsidies and assured availability of health insurance. This collec
tive preference, expressed through the political process, provides· a
powerful counterfactual to Epstein's contention that society prefers
an atomized casualty model of health insurance (pp. 124-25).
The foregoing paints a picture of a market beset with problems
of inadequate information and imperfect agency. As a result, con
sumers of health care are in many respects flying blind with respect
to the quality of what they are purchasing and often lack the oppor
tunity to make significant choices because of various structural or
other impediments in the marketplace. Meanwhile, forces are at
work that encourage insurance market participants to avoid risks,
thereby segmenting the market in a way that disfavors the un
healthy, or those with large transactions costs. While intermediat
ing agencies such as certifying agents, boards of standards, group
purchasing coalitions, and the like may develop naturally in the
marketplace, the evidence suggests that they are slow to appear ori
the scene. In addition, the recent torrent of legislation regulating
health insurance and delivery markets suggests a social preference
for market alternatives that embody cross-subsidies of various kinds
and guaranteed availability of affordable insurance for consumers.
Though these points offer only a snapshot of the issues complicating
the performance of health care markets, the message should be
clear: stripping government of any role in regulating health mar
kets is unlikely to produce more efficient outcomes or satisfy socie
tal preferences.
Ill RATIONING AND SCARCITY
Epstein's inquiry into the problem of access to health care (or
positive rights, as he frames the issue) begins in the right place.
"Legal entitlements must be geared for a world of scarcity, that is,
fonn Packages, HEALTH A.FF. , Fall 1996, at 35, 38 (describing various insurance market
reforms).
40. Pub. L. No. 104-191, §§ 701-707, 2711-2713, 2741-2747, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939-55, 196267, 2741-47.
41. State Children's Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397aa-1397jj (West Supp.
1997).
42. See Hilary Stout, Children's Health Program is an Unlikely Survivor, WALL ST. J.,
July 30, 1997, at A6.
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for a world where some legitimate wants have to remain unsatis
fied" (p. 44). Unqualified claims to a right to health care will ulti
mately impinge on other "legitimate wants," so it is incumbent
upon rights advocates to come up with some limiting principles.
Scholars and regulators have undeniably struggled in attempting to
devise a workable definition and regulatory scheme that would
cabin rights to a "decent minimum" of health care.43 It bears em
phasizing - as Epstein certainly does - that any policy promising
a�cess to health care need� to deal with a host of controversy-laden
questions: What care is to be provided?' To whom? Who will ra
tion care? And subject to what procedures and standards?
Epstein himself need not answer any of these questions, how
ever, for his vision is of a society in which price rations health care
jµst as it does most goods and services. Those unable or unwilling
to pay will either do without or - if they are lucky - find help
through private charities. In the long run, all citizens will benefit
from the larger economic pie and the proper alignment of
incentives.
For those who do not happen to inhabit the long run, however,
the picture is considerably bleaker. As Uwe Reinhardt bluntly put
it, "[Epstein's] argument seems to be that poor children in one gen
eration can properly be left to suffer, so that all children of future
generations may be made better off than they otherwise would have
been."44 More about the implications of the libertarian prescription
later. This section first analyzes Epstein's treatment of the problem
of access to care, finding that his account of contemporary positive
rights to health care is flawed descriptively and conceptually.
Epstein identifies positive rights to health care in a variety of
legal settings: government financing programs like Medicare and
Medicaid; common law decisions that require "hospitals to provide
emergency care to indigent patients; federal laws requiring that hos
pitals provide certain care to all individuals as a condition of partici
pation in the Medicare program; and various statutes governing
private insurance that foster cross-subsidies. His broad critique of
positive rights, however, does not fit all these cases. Providing
health care services to the poor, for example, scarcely resembles the
open-ended right to care that Epstein decries. In this regard, he
seems bent on equating all health entitlements to the open check
book that the Medicare program arguably provides. But such is as
suredly not the case with respect to indigent care, which is provided
43. See 1 PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. FOR TiiE STUDY OF EnncAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE &
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: A REPORT
ON TiiE EnnCAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES IN THE AVAILABILITY OF HEALTH SERV
ICES {1983).
44. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Wanted: A Clearly Articulated Social Ethic for American Health
Care, 278 JAMA 1446, 1447 {1997).
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through public health programs and Medicaid. These programs
have long distinguished among the needy by various categories specifically favoring women with children, children, the disabled,
and the elderly. Nor do the other means of providing health care to
the poor - emergency care at hospitals, free care in clinics, and
charitable care from private physicians - constitute an open-ended
entitlement. The poor receive only sixty percent of the services of
comparable insured citizens.45 Further, even those legally entitled
to parity with the private sector find their care rationed: studies
show that Medicaid beneficiaries receive f ewer services, have less
access to physicians, and are subject to considerably more delay and
inconvenience than the insured population.46 Far from ignoring the
problem of scarcity, then, American policymakers have summoned
the political courage to ration health care to the poor.
Epstein next embarks on a muddled and confusing argument
contending that the problem of medical futility illustrates how "the
theory of positive rights runs awry" (p. 81). End-of-life situations
pose intractable problems because of the uncertainty in identifying
situations of futility and in securing legal enforcement of rules re
quiring cessation of treatment (pp. 69-71). In these circumstances,
the problems of demanded care arise: individuals who can obtain
care at other people's expense often do so and impose severe costs
on the public sector. Yet Epstein goes on to acknowledge that all
measures for dealing with the problem are problematic. As a result
of medical ethics, human nature, humanitarian impulses, and the
uncertain state of science, the available solutions - advance direc
tives, contracting, and global budgets - are of questionable effi
cacy in addressing the problem. Thus, instead of demonstrating
that the regime of positive rights is to blame for demanded care,
Epstein has shown that a web of other social and institutional cir
cumstances contributes to the difficulty we have "saying no" in end
of-life cases. Exploring on utilitarian grounds the competing merits
of rationing through consumer choice, bureaucratic mechanisms,
and physician direction would seem to be a necessary predicate to
reaching conclusions about the proper scope of positive rights in
these circumstances. What we are given instead is an account that
decries government's unwillingness to confront the scarcity prob
lem, but that affords no new insights as to how society should per
form the rationing that scarcity analysis mandates.47
45. See id. at 1446.
46. See id.
47. An extraordinarily thorough and thoughtful examination of these issues may be
found in a recent book by Mark Hall. See HALL, supra note 32, at 43-50; see also Gail
Agrawal, Chicago Hope Meets the Chicago School, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1793 (1998) (reviewing
HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS).
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Dumping on EMTALA
Concluding his analysis of scarcity and indigent care, Epstein
homes in on the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA),48 which he regards as a particularly good example of
the pitfalls of governmental policies that create a positive right to
health care. EMTALA obligates hospitals that accept Medicare or
Medicaid and operate emergency rooms to screen (examine) all
persons presenting in the emergency room and to provide treat
ment sufficient to stabilize those patients who are in labor or in an
emergency condition. Hospitals must provide these services to all
comers regardless of ability to pay. The right created by EMTALA
is positive, but limited: EMTALA does not prohibit transfers after
stabilization and permits hospitals to divert individuals coming to
their emergency qepartment.49 For Epstein, EMTALA is "an insti
tutional mistake whose intended benefits are more than offset by its
hidden costs" (p. 94). Among the hidden costs are closing and
downsizing of emergency rooms; excessive demand and long
queues for service; disincentives for new firms to enter the emer
gency services market; increased risky behavior due to moral haz
ard; and unequal burdens across hospitals. This is one of the few
instances in which the author delves into the empirical and policy
studies of health markets and thus his treatment merits closer
analysis.
The thrust . of Epstein's argument is that EMTALA has
prompted closings of trauma and emergency centers where they are
most needed and has interfered with the ability of managers of hos
pitals to triage patients efficiently and perhaps save. lives in the long
run. There may ,be a kernel of truth to this argument, but it is
hardly established by the sources cited. Moreover, the author's fail
ure to place EMTALA in context with other laws and develop
ments in the health care industry leads him to draw overblown
conclusions that conveniently suit his preference for autonomy.
First, Epstein relies almost exclusively on a 1991 General Ac
counting Office study that documents the closure of trauma centers
owing to financial losses.50 While this study does note the phenom48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West 1992).
49. See Johnson v. University of Chicago Hosps., 982 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1993) (per
curiam) (diverting ambulances via telemetry does not violate EMTALA).
50. See U.S. GEN. AccoUNTING OFFICE, TRAUMA CARE: LIFE SAVING SYSTEM
THREATENED BY UNREIMBURSED Cosrs AND OTHER FACTORS, GAO/HRD-91-57 (1991).
Epstein also offers some anecdotal evidence about the University of Chicago's \vithdrawal
from a cooperative protocol with other hospitals for directing emergency care, but that expe
rience is unpersuasive particularly in view of the fact that its emergency room did not close
and is still subject to EMTALA. See Troyen A. Brennan, Moral Imperatives Versus Market
Solutions: Is Health Care a Right?, 65 U. Cm. L. REv. 345, 355 (1998) (reviewing MORTAL
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enon, it does not attribute the closings to EMTALA in the simpli
fied, post hoc ergo propter hoc fashion that Epstein does. Indeed,
. empirical evidence recently gathered by Troyen Brennan indicates,
contrary to Epstein's causal model, that hospital closures correlate
positively with the absence of emergency departments.st The rea
sons that not-for-profit hospitals shift away from the unprofitable
business of emergency care are certainly economic, but they are
also multifaceted. As a general matter, the pressures of managed
care and tightened provider payments from Medicare and Medicaid
have significantly shrunk the margins hospitals formerly used to
cross-subsidize charity care.s2 Moreover, the unquestioned over
supply of acute care hospital capacity has spurred downsizings, re
organizations, and closures of many hospitals. HMOs and other
managed care entities have placed strong pressures on providers
and patients to reduce overutilization of inpatient facilities and par
ticularly to curb unnecessary use of the emergency room.s3 Physi
cians and hospitals have responded by altering patterns of care and
establishing stand-alone care centers and other means of substitut
ing for treatment in an emergency room. Nor does the presence of
an emergency room work exclusively to the hospitals' detriment. In
some instances, managed care entities have accused hospitals of
taking advantage of their emergency facilities by over-treating and
over-admitting privately insured patients.s4 Further, other factors
su�h as increased liability risks for malpractice and regulatory pres
sures may have contributed to hospitals' unwillingness to continue
to operate emergency rooins.ss Thus the impulse to close emer
gency units or reduce indigent patient care is a systemic issue, and
not traceable to EMTALA alone.
Finally, hospitals' obligations to provide free care arise from a
variety of sources: state laws requiring emergency treatment or
open access, tax-exempt status, community pressures, and charter
obligations, to mention a few. The extent to which EMTALA's re
quirements of screening and stabilizing patients create significant
additional obligations is far from clear. Moreover, EMTALA can
be seen as effectively reinforcing other public policies, like the char
itable obligations of tax-exempt institutions, that may not otherwise
be efficiently policed.
51. See Brennan, supra note 50, at 354 n.10.
52. See Erik J. Olson, Note, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency
Room, 46 STAN. L. REv. 449, 468-70 (1994).
53. See Diane Hoffmann, Emergency Care and Managed Care - A Dangerous
Combination, 72 WASH. L. REv. 315 (1997).
54. See Loren A. Johnson "& Robert W. Derlet, Conflicts Between Managed Care
Organizations and Emergency Departments in California, 164 W. J. MED. 137 (1996).
55. See Mark Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 38 JuruMETRICS J.
389, 393-94 (1998).
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Epstein also argues that EMTALA increases demand for emer
gency room. .services. One hardly knows whether to take. seriously
his claim that EMTALA gives rise to a serious moral hazard prob
lem - that is, it encourages risky activities that individuals would
otherwise not undertake. The bulk of behaviors that produce true
emergencies requiring emergency room services - automobile ac
cidents, gunshots, and labor and delivery complications - are
hardly the kind of activities involving much deliberation. Positing
that individuals undertaking such risky behavior are influenced by
the availability of health insurance is, well, absurd. Epstein takes
the point even further: Hospitals should be left unfettered in order
ing the affairs of their emergency departments, even to the extent of
refusing care because· of the self-inflicted nature of an illness.56
Epstein's defense of such denials on utilitarian grounds rings
hollow. Can one. really expect that triage determinations made in
emergency departments will effectively balance the costs and bene
fits of individual treatment? Is it not more likely that moral judg
ments about drugs Qr sexual orientation or other factors such as
race or class will predominate?
Make no mistake. EMTALA is a poorly drafted, band-aid stat
ute that has undoubtedly produced unintended consequences.57
But it does respond to the well-documented58 problem of finan
cially motivated, health-threatening transfers - a phenomenon
that Epstein does not refute. Indeed, today's competitive environ
ment is undeniably more prone to patient dumping than the situa
tion that prevailed at the time of the enactment of EMTALA.

Simple Rules, Preposterous Prescriptions
Ultimately Epstein argues against the government's assuring
minimum level of health care. Indeed, he would reject most
transfers to supply indigent care, including seemingly high benefit/

any

56. Epstein pulls no punches on this issue and apparently would grant hospitals wide
discretion in choosing their emergency care patients:
Unfortunately the current law makes it impossible for a hospital to treat drug addicts or
alcoholics just once, or even twice, with this stem warning: there is no treatment next
time, period - no matter what their personal consequences, including death. To the
question, "you cannot let them die, can you?" we have to avoid the reflexive answer, no.
To restore long-term stability to the system of emergency care, the answer has to be
"yes, we can sometimes."

P. 103.

57. See Hoffmann, supra note 53; David A. Hyman, Patient Dumping and EMTALA:
Past Imperfect/Future Shock, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 29 (1998); Lawrence E. Singer, Look What
They've Done to My Law, Ma: COBRA's Implosion, 33 Hous. L. REv. 113, 117-18 (1996);
Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act: Denial
of Emergency Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 NoTRE DAME L.

REv. 1121 (1992).
58. See Robert L. Schiff et al., Transfers to Public Hospitals, 314 NEW ENG. J. MEo. 552,
552 (1986).
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low cost programs such as the recently enacted expansion of Medi
caid to cover poor children.59 Though ostensibly relying on a utili
tarian balancing of alternative means of satisfying social needs,60 his
account is singularly unpersuasive and lacking even the gloss of an
ecdote, let alone an empirical basis. Ultimately his position must be
understood as resting on a libertarian preference for avoiding gov
ernment coercion rather than on any careful assessment of impact
on social welfare.

Epstein begins by taking on the common perception that society
would realize a gain in net utility by redistributing some modest
quantum of health services to the poor. Repeating the familiar ra
tionale that comparisons of utility are "conceptually impossible," he
asserts that " [t]o make utility the coin of the political realm is to
invite piteous tales of woe, exaggerated for the partisan purpose for
which they are made" (p. 35). This position is vastly overstated.
Herbert Hovenkamp has persuasively argued that it is possible to
make objective welfare judgments that do not require highly indi
viduated comparisons of utility. One may assume realistically that
similarities among individuals occur over a small range of their util
ity functions, particularly those that involve primary goods.61 Ob
jective welfare judgments are commonplace in economics and in
law and economics and they certainly drive the judgments of policy
makers and social scientists.62

In any event, Epstein goes on to acknowledge that it is precisely
the ability to make interpersonal utility comparisons that drives
charitable giving, not to mention many other exchanges in every
day life. While accepting the notion that individuals perform utility

59. Arguing against expanding Medicaid to cover ten million children, Epstein wrote in a
letter to the New York Tlilles:
[E]xpanding subsidized care will drive private insurers from the market, thereby turning
a larger fraction of working citizens into wards of the state . . . [T]he new plan introduces
large deadweight administrative costs, invites the overuse of medical care and reduces
parental incentives to prevent accident or illness.
By providing free public care, we further undercut charitable institutions and blunt
efforts to slim down the vast licensing and regulatory apparatus that makes medical care
unaffordable to so many. Mrs. Clinton's implicit premise is that Federal subsidies can
offset Federal regulation. Mine is that we could do better with less regulation and less
subsidy. Scarcity matters, even in health care.
Richard A. Epstein, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at 14.
60. See id.
61.
[O]bjective welfare criteria can be used to make judgments that for most people the
marginal utility of food or housing is greater, up to some point, than the marginal utility
of jewelry or fast cars. Most people value such primary goods more highly, until they are
supplied in some minimum sufficient quantity, than they value other goods further up
the chain.
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits ofPreference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 4, 78
(1994).
62. See id. at 81-83 (describing use of objective welfare judgments in economics and in
law and economics).
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comparisons when making charitable donations, Epstein argues
that this does not open the barn door for permitting the govern
ment to make similar determinations. He contends that the state is
poorly equipped to make reliable comparisons for other people be
cause of "[i]ts lumbering structure," "bureaucratic incentives," and
the influence of "fierce and partisan politics" (p. 37). Moreover,
charitable arrangements permit donors to "compare their own wel
fare with the welfare of unidentified strangers in need and to re
solve their internal conflicts against some narrow conception of
their own economic self-interest" (p. 36). Hence, some form of ob
jective welfare comparison is indeed possible and probably done in
a manner quite similar to that proposed above. The key difference
lies in Epstein's unwillingness to substitute assessments of aggre
gate utility of citizens for individualized assessments by donors. At
bottom, this position flows more from the author's antipathy to co
ercion than from a comparison of the efficiency of the two alterna
tives, for Epstein makes no attempt to evaluate the merits of the
two institutions in this respect. There are certainly many efficiency
questions that can be raised about the mechanics of private charity.
For example, how effectively can donors monitor and police chari
ties to overcome information, collective action, and monitoring
problems? The notorious and scandalous conduct of directors and
managers of not-for-profit hospitals and Blue Cross plans in recent
years should surely give pause to anyone asserting that the not-for
profit sector is an efficient substitute for government.63
One of the more surprising aspects of Mortal Peril is that the
author does not attempt to defend systematically his contention
that charity will emerge to at least alleviate the suffering that would
be caused by the wholesale elimination of government-supplied
care and subsidies. For example, he offers no support for the im
plicit contention that charitable impulse is thwarted or suppressed
by the existence of large government programs. Is one to believe
that potential suppliers of charity care are fooled into thinking that
Medicare and Medicaid satisfy all the needs of the poor? Likewise,
there is no attempt to give assurance that society can realistically
count on new charitable sources to supply indigent care in the stag
gering amounts required even partially to replace government pro
grams. There is ample basis for skepticism: government program
outlays for Medicaid alone in fiscal year 1996 totaled $160 billion,64

63. See Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal
Response to Hospitals' Changes in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 231-32 (1997).
64. See U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Health Care Fmancing Administration,
HCFA Statistics: Expenditures (visited June 2, 1998) <http://www.hcfa.gov/stats/hstats96/
blustat2.htm>.
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while aggregate charitable giving in the United States was only $150
billion.65
IV.

INSURANCE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Epstein's concept of private health insurance is a bold one.
That is a polite way of saying that his model of insurance would be
totally unrecognizable to the vast majority of consumers and policy
makers in this (or any other) country. Of course, Epstein's self
described "contrarian" thinking should not disqualify his ideas from
serious consideration; perhaps he has unearthed a better way to or
ganize the market for private health insurance. Unfortunately, he
has not. This Part argues that Epstein's analysis is fatally flawed by
its inattention to the economics of health insurance. Because his
vision is strongly refracted by a libertarian lens, he ignores the im
perfections that plague the market for health insurance. Conse
quently, his account cannot be said to offer greater market
efficiency, however that term is defined. Moreover, the libertarian
focus presumes an atomistic conception of insurance that is at odds
with the prevailing societal conception of that product, expressed in
numerous legislative choices. Changing that conception is certainly
possible, but why should we assume that a market exists for a prod
uct that the American society has collectively rejected?
Epstein's approach dichotomizes broadly between casualty in
surance, in which each person's premium is calibrated as closely as
possible to the individual risk she transfers to the carrier, and social
insurance, in which government interventions of various kinds en
hance risk redistribution. Laws supporting community rating,
prohibiting genetic discrimination, or barring pre-existing condi
tions terms in insurance contracts are unacceptable to Epstein for
their redistributional tendencies. In addition, Epstein argues that
efforts to promote broader . risk sharing or risk redistribution
destabilize markets as insurers vie for better risk pools. "Correct
risk classification allows the insurance market to reach a stable
equilibrium" (p. 121), while interference with that process blocks
efficient resource allocation.
Note that this account does not recognize the pooling function
of insurance. Pooling entails spreading variations in medical spend
ing across a group. To be sure, cross-subsidies occur in heterogene
ous groups as premiums paid by those with better-than-average
risks help cover the costs of those with worse-than-average risks.
Low-risk individuals accept this arrangement because they want to
be able to enjoy the benefits of pooling when they become worse65. See Adam Bryant, Companies Oppose Idea of Disclosing Charitable Giving, N.Y.
Apr. 3, 1998, at Al.
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than-average risks, as most people do over their lifetime. Unfortu
nately, market forces attack pooling as insurers that have strong
financial incentives seek out better risks.66 The consequence of this
process, called risk segmentation, is that high-risk individuals find
insurance unavailable or prohibitively expensive.67 Likewise, the
benefits to low-risk individuals may prove to be short-lived, as ag
ing and unexpected illness (their own or that of members of their
families) turn the tables on them.68 The market might be expected
to solve this problem through multi-year or lifetime insurance con
tracts. No such contracts exist, however, probably owing in part to
the risks of adverse selection and other market imperfections.69 Ul
timately policymakers confront a trade-off between risk segmenta
tion and risk pooling. Unfortunately, economics cannot answer the
question of which imposes higher social costs. Proponents of insur
ance market reform point out, however, that reducing risk segmen
tation comes at a relatively small cost and that the advantages of
assurances of affordable insurance over time suggest broad popular
support for such implicit taxes.10
Insurance law and policy in the United States, consisting of legal
interpretations, legislation, and administrative rulings, have never
been guided by a single overriding principle. Economic, distribu
tional, and equitable goals have all influenced the nature of insur
ance products.71 There is no question, of course, about the fact that
economic goals have been predominant. Indeed, many legal inter
ventions seek to assure that the market can function properly, such
as by dealing with transactions costs, adverse selection, and infor
mation gaps.72 Other regulations are designed to redistribute risk
and have the effect of sacrificing efficiency for the sake of redistrib
uting wealth. Thus, 1aws regulating community rating promote
redistributional ends, _ while others, such as those governing sol·

66. See Alan C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Market-Based Reform: What to Regulate and
By Whom, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 105, 107.
-

67. Considerations of justice and social cohesion, not addressed in this review, are also
raised by risk segmentation. See, e.g., Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul ofHealth
Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH PoL PoLY. & L. 285, 290 (1993) ("Actuarial fairness - each person
paying for his own risk - is . . . a method of organizing mutual aid by fragmenting communi
ties into ever-smaller, more homogeneous groups and a method that leads ultimately to the
destruction of mutual aid."). For an excellent analysis of Epstein's treatment of insurance
regulation issues from a Rawlsian perspective, see Russell Korobkin, Determining Health
Care Rights from Behind a Veil ofIgnorance, ILL L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
68. See Linda J. Blumberg & Len M. Nichols, Health Insurance Market Reforms: What
They Can and Cannot Do (visited May 8, 1998) <http:l/www.urban.org/pubs/hinsure/insure.
htm>.
69. See Blumberg & Nichols, supra note 39, at 38.
70. See id. at 38-39.
71. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RlsK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 9-10 (1986).
72. See id. at 210.
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vency and mandating simplicity in contracts, standardized benefits,
and greater information for consumers help improve market effi
ciency. The law governing health insurance has vacillated between
encouraging greater pooling or sharing of risk and requiring a
closer relation between health status and premiums. The trend in
recent years has been unmistakably toward encouraging risk shar
ing or pooling.73
My principal concern with Epstein's approach to regulation of
insurance is his failure to acknowledge that some laws may improve
the performance of health care markets. As noted above, control
ling risk segmentation is at the heart of market reform efforts
designed to improve efficiency.74 An enormous policy literature
has developed concerning the steps necessary to avoid risk selec
tion, to promote the gathering and use of information, and to pre
vent abuses of market power. Although details and policy
prescriptions vary, legislation to support risk pooling, minimize var
iations in benefit packages, eliminate tax subsidies, promote joint
purchasing of insurance, guarantee issue and renewal of policies,
and implement other steps has been proposed by economists of all
political stripes to deal with these issues.75 Finding the appropriate
mix of policies is indeed a daunting challenge, but that does not
excuse overlooking the complexities of the various proposals, as
Epstein does. Simple solutions here are possible only if one
chooses to define away the core economic problem.
V.

MEDICARE AND THE CLINTON HEALTH REFORMS

Part I of Mortal Peril concludes with two extended chapters ana
lyzing Medicare (unoriginally subtitled "The Third Rail of Ameri
can Politics") and the Clinton administration's Health Security Act
(HSA) (aptly subtitled "The Shipwreck"). For Epstein, these pro
grams epitomize all that is bad in positive rights to health care:
inefficiency, coercion, bureaucracy, unintended consequences, and
73. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends ofHealth Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 311, 313-14
(1997); see also supra notes 37-39.
74. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTII CARE LAw AND PouCY: READINGS, NoTES,
AND QUESTioNs 1108-10 (1988) ("Adverse selection is potentially the Achilles heel of a
health policy relying on consumer choice . . . . (but] an intensely practical problem that may
be amenable to practical solutions."); Blumberg & Nichols, supra note 68; Alain C.
Enthoven, Effective Management of Competition in the FEHBP, HEALTII AFF., Fall 1989, at
33, 34 (discussing adverse selection under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program);
Stanley B. Jones, Can Multiple Choice Be Managed to Constrain Health Care Costs?, HEALTII
AFF. , Fall 1989, at 51, 54.
75. See, e.g., MARK V. PAULY ET AL., REsPONSIBLE NATIONAL HEALTII INSURANCE
(1992); Stuart M. Butler, The Conservative Agenda, in THE PROBLEM THAT WoN'T Go
AwAY: REFORMING U.S. HEALTII FINANCING 236 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1996); Paul M.
Ellwood, "Responsible Choices": The Jackson Hole Group Plan for Health Reform, HEALTII
AFF., Summer 1995, at 24, 25; Enthoven & Singer, supra note 66, at 105, 107.
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excessive cost. His grasp of the mechanics and details of these com
plex programs is impressive. His careful dissection of the fl.awed
regulatory structures of each is a model of clear economic and pol
icy analysis. The overarching message - that regulating price and
quality in a complex industry like health care is a daunting, if not
intractable, task for governments - is one that should be carefully
observed by policymakers. Unfortunately, Epstein misses the fact
that many of these same underlying conditions bedevil private mar
kets and evidence the need for market-improving regulation. In
many respects, the HSA, the rival bills before Congress in 1994, and
many reforms subsequently considered by the states have been
aimed at addressing those problems. As discussed below, these
chapters also suffer from a number of problems that undermine the
successful technical analysis of the programs.

History, Politics, and Public Choice
Epstein portrays Medicare as a program born in economic
naYvete and inaccurate actuarial estimates, with every attempt to
confine costs succumbing to incentives built into the program. The
lesson? "[N]ever start down a road that promises to give subsidies;
but once given, seek to limit them if possible" (p. 182). Epstein's
historical account is seriously deficient and his prescription slights
the program's purposes and achievements. First, Epstein does not
acknowledge that Medicare's original sin - a cost-based provider
reimbursement system only loosely policed by private in
termediaries - was the product of explicit lobbying and coercion
by the provider community.76 The perverse incentives that fueled
Medicare's spiraling costs might just as easily be laid at the door of
interest group politics as at the door of positive rights. Epstein's
response appears to be that positive rights have inherently expan
sionist tendencies. But is this true? It can hardly be argued that
positive rights to public education, public housing, and food stamps
have produced a spiraling growth in those entitlements. One might
well look to the marriage of middle class entitlements and non
market payments to providers for a more satisfying explanation of
Medicare's unbridled growth.
Second, Epstein's utilitarian account is completely one-sided in
that it does not mention important items on the benefit side of the
cost-benefit ledger. It entirely neglects the fact, for example, that
Medicare was designed to reduce poverty among the elderly, and
that it has been highly successful in this regard.77 Moreover, there
76. See THEODORE R. MARMoR, THE PoLrncs OF MEDICARE 70-73 {1973); Thomas L.
Greaney, Transforming Medicare Through Physician Payment Reform: An Introduction to
the Symposium, 34 ST. LoUis U. LJ. 749, 750-54 {1990).
77. See Bruce Vladeck, Medicare at 30, 274 JAMA 259 {1995).
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is no mention of Medicare's important ancillary roles - namely,
providing enormous subsidies to medical education and scientific
research.78 Here one again finds Epstein's libertarian preferences
dressed up as utilitarian analysis. In one astonishing passage, for
example, Epstein criticizes judicial decisions upholding Medicare's
freezes on prices paid to physicians based on the fact that physician
participation in the program is voluntary: "Claims of physician vol
untariness myopically ignore the system of taxes and subsidies that
make the government the sole primary provider of medical services
to persons over age 65 and to disabled persons" (p. 90). Appar
ently, the six billion dollars in federal funds flowing in the other
direction - subsidizing physicians' education - eluded Epstein's
clear-eyed calculus.
Epstein also offers a selective reading of the history and politics
of the HSA. He correctly identifies a number of factors that under
mined public support: the Clinton administration's "[g]affes and in
trigues" (p. 192), including its propensity to promise everything to
everyone; the plan's complexity; and its disguised but pervasive reg
ulatory apparatus. But he goes on to draw some perplexing and
unsupported conclusions about the causes of the plan's demise.
The HSA "could have done little to improve the lot of the unin
sured" (p. 215); it lost support because it "operated as a wealth
transfer from the low-risk uninsureds to the high-risk uninsureds"
(p. 197); it was the victim of having "oversold equality" (p. 199);
and it ultimately fell victim to its "egalitarian impulse" (p. 215).
The influence of massive lobbying and campaign contributions by
special interests is only obliquely acknowledged: "The special in
terests did line up against the plan, and for once they represented
just about everyone" (p. 215).
The extensive postmortem literature on the HSA identifies sev
eral factors of greater importance than those Epstein highlights.
Prominent among the concerns of the public and politicians were
the plan's potential cost, the prospect of the rationing of health
care, and the possibility that the plan might interfere with patients'
choice of providers.79 Moreover, studies indicate that public sup
port for universal access to insurance and reform of insurance mar
kets remained strong despite the defeat of HSA.80 The torrent of
legislation regulating insurance and managed care and expanding
access to health insurance underscores the point that, if any collec
tive preference was expressed in 1994, it was assuredly not what
78. See id.
79. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, BEGINNINGS COUNT: THE TECHNOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE IN
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 152-53 (1997); Robert J. Blendon, What Happened to Americans'
Support for the Clinton Health Plan?, HEALTH A.FF., Summer 1995, at 7, 11; James Fallows, A
Triumph of Misinformation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 26, 1995, at 26.
80. See, e.g., Blendon, supra note 79, at 20-21.
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Epstein suggests. His conclusion that the episode is a shining exam
ple of the democratic process correctly rejecting subsidies and posi
tive rights seems more like wishful thinking than the product of a
careful evaluation of the evidence.

What Is to Be Done?
Mortal Peril offers no more concrete analysis of what to do with
Medicare or managed care regulation than it does for indigent care
programs like Medicaid. At one point Epstein suggests that medi
cal savings accounts might be a move in the right direction but that
"the present set of feeble alternatives [increased deductibles and
copayments; increased choice of plan; reduced coverage for hospital
stays] may be the best that can be enacted" (p. 182). In fact, with
the adoption of Medicare+Choice in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997, Congress took a definitive step toward bringing Medicare into
the mainstream of managed care. 1bis move, bolder than anything
proposed in the Clinton reforms, suggests that the supposed inevita
bility of fixed or expanding entitlements is incorrect.
While Epstein fails to offer programmatic solutions to problems,
there is no shortage of broad-brush assertions about the fundamen
tal principles that should apply. One such principle is the rather
protean concept of generational equity. Epstein recounts, for ex
ample, an episode in which he was asked to participate in a panel of
scholars and experts on a television program concerning the Clin
ton Health Reform proposal.
[A]n earnest University of Chicago undergraduate . . . had the temer
ity to ask . . . why he should have to fund the health insurance costs of
his grandparents' generation. A representative of the AARP fum
bled with a reply that stated in essence that in the long run the student
would benefit from the same system that imposed this short-term dis
location. Consistent with the norms of so much social accounting, no
present-value calculations of benefits and cost were offered. It hardly
mattered that the over-65 generation were large net recipients, and
the under-25 generation large net payers. [p. x]

Net recipients? Net payers? Of what? Epstein seems suddenly to
suffer from tunnel vision when advocating inter-generational eq
uity. Consider what a principled and beady-eyed utilitarian's
calculus would look like. Surely it would include the present value
of the costs incurred by the grandparents' generation in preserving
the free market. Therefore it would take into account the lost lives
and forgone income during World War II and perhaps the taxes
spent on military expenditures during the Cold War. What of the
tax-subsidized education and health benefits the undergraduate's
generation has received? And the public expenditures through
Medicare and other programs on medical education, research, and
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public health that have produced an uncommonly healthy (albeit
ungrateful) under-twenty-five generation?
Equally unsatisfying is the book's treatment of managed care.
In Epstein's view, most regulation of managed care is a bad idea,
but his discussion of these issues never confronts those reforms
aimed at improving competition and correcting market imperfec
tions. Though the regulatory issues surrounding provider con
tracting and insurance are among the most important and difficult
economic problems faced by policymakers today, Epstein treats the
subject as an afterthought. In a Postscript, Epstein sketches the pit
falls of regulatory developments such as "any willing provider"
laws, which ensure doctors' ability to offer services within a plan as
long as they agree to the plan's terms and conditions, and efforts to
regulate HMOs. After correctly identifying the capacity of these
laws to undermine the potential benefits of managed care, Epstein
fails to draw any connection with the vested provider interests that
drive many reforms that are misleadingly billed as "consumer pro
tection" measures.81 Moreover, many of the landmarks that com
plicate the issue of regulation in the area are never addressed:
•

•

•

The Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA),82 which pre
vents states from regulating self-insured employers, is perhaps the
most important regulatory complication facing lawmakers.
The $100 billioµ. federal tax subsidy for private health insurance (a
sum greater than the cost of providing coverage for every uninsured
person in the country)83 distorts economic incentives, regressively
allocates tax burdens, and encourages inefficient insurance purchas
ing decisions.84
Employer sponsored insurance, encouraged by tax laws and other
regulations, distorts employment market decisions and creates
other inefficiencies for certain purchasers of health insurance.85

If

Epstein endorses legislative repeal of these complications, he
should say so and address whatever dislocations that repeal may
cause. However, back-benching on managed care regulation with
out acknowledging the current regulatory context makes for shoddy
policy analysis.
81. See Peter T. Kilborn, Bills Regulating Managed Care Benefit Doctors, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1998, at Al.
82. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001-lOOlb (West Supp. 1998).
83. See Reinhardt, supra note 44, at 1447.
84. See SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 80-81
(1997).
85. See Michael J. Graetz, Universal Health Coverage Without an Employer Mandate,
DOMESTIC AFF., Wmter, 1993-94, at 83.
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CONCLUSION

Mortal Peril teaches us several lessons. First principles yield few
concrete policies. Those policies that do emerge from Epstein's
first principles would leave tens of millions more citizens without
insurance or health care, may permit insurance markets to unravel,
and would block efforts to improve competition. Libertarians' in
sistence on autonomy will thwart effective market regulation that
could produce more efficient economic outcomes. Simple rules are
not costless: complex problems may require nuanced solutions.
Courageous as it may seem to some to let people die, it may not be
all that efficient.
Epstein mentions on several occasions the profound influence
that his father, a radiologist, had on his thinking about this subject.
He learned valuable lessons about charitable care, the perils of
Medicare, and the fundamentals of medical ethics. I, too, learned
some valuable lessons from my father, a shipyard worker who lost
his pension and medical benefits
twice
when the shipyards in
which he worked went out of business. Most, but not all, of his
enormous end-of-life medical bills were paid for by Medicare. A
big, good-natured Irishman, he never displayed any bitterness
about his plight. But he did worry a lot about the bij.ls and at
tempted to forgo expensive treatments whenever possible. Some
costs are harder to measure than others.
-

-

